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Giuseppina Iacono Lobo has taken up the history of conscience 
in the political, ideological, and theological conflicts of seventeen-
century England. This period is one of the best examples of the 
problems that arise when people are motivated by their consciences. 
As she demonstrates through exhaustive archival and textual research, 
conflicts over the meaning of conscience and the attempts to achieve a 
“clear” conscience or preserve freedom of conscience weave themselves 
through all the most contentious theological and political moments 
of seventeenth-century England. 
The Introduction to the book gives a short account of the history 
of conscience, mostly in the wake of Henry VIII’s break with Rome. 
This reader found it the weakest part of the book. It is at once too 
apologetic, trying to justify the point of her study, and too superficial. 
This would have been the place to address the deep theology underlying 
the idea of conscience. When the theology changed, conscience took 
on a different role. Had she done so, there would have been no need 
for justifying her argument. For instance, in her brief look at one of 
the most famous engagements of conscience since the early Christian 
martyrs, she writes, “When faced with the scruples or grudges of their 
consciences, both Henry and More grounded their interior surety upon 
the exterior consensus of what they perceived as Christendom” (12). 
Up to a point. Thomas More described himself as God’s servant first, 
not a servant to the consensus of Christendom. This is the problem 
with the idea of conscience, a problem Christianity has struggled 
with since the beginning. On the one hand, it is a religion of right 
belief, orthodoxy, unlike Judaism which is a religion of right practice, 
orthopraxy. As she explains, because Christians were released from the 
practices of Jewish law, Paul had to introduce the idea of conscience as 
a means of knowing when one was in the right or the wrong. In other 
words, where the priest is commanded in Leviticus 1:16 to throw the 
crop and feathers of a sacrificed bird to the east of the altar, throwing 
them to the west is clearly wrong. But what does the Christian do? 
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Even the passage she cites from Paul contains the seeds of the prob-
lem: “For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer 
sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: How 
much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit 
offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead 
works to serve the living God?” (Hebrews 9:13–14 KJV). Those “dead 
works” might be left behind, but service still requires action on the 
part of the Christian, that is, it requires practice in the world. Some 
practices will be sinful and others not, presumably, so the distinction 
between orthodoxy and orthopraxy is not so clear. 
While many cultures, religions and philosophies have adopted 
the idea of the conscience, or something like the tribunal within the 
self that we take it to be, it is at root a Christian concept. Even Greek 
philosophy did not develop a fully formed idea of it as the Christian 
theologians would do, starting with St. Paul. It is for this reason 
there is no equivalent of Augustine’s Confessions earlier or elsewhere. 
Historians of ideas have studied the origins of the conscience and its 
spread. What they have paid less attention to is the question of why 
anyone would want to import a foreign idea that seems to bring with 
it nothing but trouble, both individually and politically. Lobo does 
not try to answer this question of why, but she does give a clear picture 
of the problems conscience can lead to.
Once one gets past the first chapter, the book and author come 
into their own. The close reading of the exchanges between Charles I 
and his advisors is exemplary. These men, and they were all men, truly 
struggled with their consciences. The fate of the kingdom and the king’s 
head, ultimately, rested on how they judged their actions or thought 
God would judge them. Where does responsibility lie?  Is it the case, 
as one of the soldiers Henry V spoke with while disguised on the eve 
of battle, that if “his [the king’s] cause be wrong, our obedience to the 
king wipes the crime of it out of us” (Henry V 4.i 183–85)?  But this 
puts all the blame on the king, meaning the king alone is responsible 
for the souls of his soldiers. Henry’s response, “Every subject’s duty 
is the king’s; but every subject’s soul is his own” (4.i 230–32), is as 
self-serving in this instance as it is well argued. It is also a literary 
miniature of what really went on between Charles I and his advisors 
John Ashburnham, John Culpepper, and Sir Henry Jermyn. As Lobo 
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shows, their arguments were not realpolitik dressed in theological lan-
guage. Clearly their positions, lives, and monarchical government itself 
were at risk, but so was this precious thing called conscience. These 
men did not separate the two. The author quotes a letter from 1646 
in which Charles I writes, “I stick not upon scruples, but undoubted 
realities, both in relation to conscience and policy” (31). Conscience 
was as real to him as were the armies massing in the field.
This correspondence would be remarkable enough, were it not 
that the Eikon Basilike was published immediately upon the king’s 
execution. This book was presented as the private meditations of 
Charles I, a look inside the man and his relation to God. It was not 
a justification for his actions or retort to his detractors. One could 
imagine it having no political importance at all. But that was not the 
case. Quite the opposite. It became one of the most important tracts in 
the Civil War, going through many printings and distributed widely. As 
Lobo points out, many of the surviving copies are so worn by obvious 
signs of use as opposed to neglect, that it is clear the book was read 
and not simply purchased (37). “It was so popular precisely because 
it was not designed to look like propaganda; instead it was designed 
to look like and, as I argue, serve the function of a devotional book” 
(39–40). She certainly does not overlook the propagandistic elements 
and uses of the book: “Charles was a king in life, a king in his suffer-
ing, and he will be a king in death: his readers could hardly replicate 
this trajectory” (40). But such a book would have had no purchase 
with readers if they had not also the same concerns about their own 
consciences. They might not have the same royal trajectory as Charles 
I, but as Christians they did have a parallel trajectory. Again, it is this 
wariness about the theology that holds Lobo back from diving deeper 
into the subject.
She comes closest to a theological study in her chapter on the 
Quakers. According to Lobo, they had a peculiar understanding 
of conscience as an external entity in which we, as individuals, can 
share. Again, a more theological explanation would serve the reader 
and her argument. Is this Quaker idea a version of monopsychism, 
normally attributed to Averroes and roundly criticized by Aquinas in 
his De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas? It certainly seems similar. 
Or might it be connected to Justin Martyr’s idea of the logos sperma-
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tikos?  More to the point, this kind of deep theological problem of 
conscience that long predates the seventeenth century underlies the 
arguments. Certainly, not all Quakers were reading Aquinas or Justin 
Martyr, but there were enough academics upon whom the king could 
call who were. 
One of the more contentious arguments in the book is the author’s 
claim that Thomas Hobbes was trying to use the idea of conscience as 
a means of bringing peace and obedience to the kingdom. According 
to Lobo, “Through his creation of the public conscience, then, Hobbes 
makes conscience itself the very cornerstone of the commonwealth” 
(117). Earlier she claims that “Conscience is thus a civilizing force in 
the condition of war, inclining the individual to give up his absolute 
liberty for the security and survival a commonwealth offers” (107). 
Her argument is that the public conscience developed by civil society 
replaces any private conscience an individual might have had in mere 
nature. This is how she explains Hobbes’s insistence that it is seditious 
to claim that anything done against one’s conscience is a sin (113). 
But it could be just as easily, and I think more convincingly, argued 
that what Hobbes was doing with the idea of conscience was redefin-
ing it into oblivion. If conscience were to become this “public” thing 
outside the individual and lodged in the institutions and laws of the 
commonwealth, the problem of individual conscience as a legitimate 
means of resistance to the state disappears. Indeed, conscience disap-
pears into orthopraxy, just as Hobbes would have wanted.
The most interesting chapter of the book is that on Lucy Hutchin-
son. Where all other major figures Lobo addresses are men, here we 
have the case of a woman playing a central role in the debates and poli-
tics connected to conscience. The episode itself is rather complicated, 
as it involves Lucy Hutchinson trying to save her husband who had 
signed the death warrant of Charles I, by allegedly forging his recanta-
tion. All of it is ably handled by Lobo and the role of conscience, of 
both husband and wife, duly explored. As a poet in her own right and 
the translator of Lucretius, Lucy Hutchinson’s thoughts on the matter 
and role in the politics of the time are a fascinating part of the book. 
The final chapter is on Milton and is another strong piece. She 
reads his works closely and widely and records some impressive finds. 
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For instance, she tells us that a 1667 copy of Paradise Lost contains 
marginalia precisely on her theme. Someone wrote the words “Horrors 
of Conscience” beside Sin’s description of her children. It is probably 
here, in the chapter on Milton, that her thesis that conscience was 
central to the idea of the nation is at its strongest and may, in fact, be 
its origin. This reader finds it hard to accept the case for much of the 
rest of the book. Again, this is because of her allergy to theology. This 
tendency becomes all the more apparent in her Afterward in which 
she turns to Matthew Arnold. There she notes his distinction between 
the French Revolution, which pressed the case of rationality, and the 
English, which relied on conscience. But she seems insensitive to a 
problem of which Arnold was well aware and, in fact, for which he is 
famous. His “long, withdrawing roar” on Dover Beach was faith slip-
ping away. The French Revolution was the most obvious and violent 
expression of this. The English Revolution was not that. It might be 
considered the last (violent) gasp of the wars of religion. Thereafter 
we had wars of ideology, where conscience spoke not at all.
This is a fine work of scholarship. The criticisms noted here cannot 
take away from the accomplishment that it is. Lobo has not taken 
the argument in all the ways this reviewer might have wished, but it 
makes no less of a contribution for that. Instead, the materials here 
assembled and the insights provided will be a source of many future 
debates and disagreements, all of them better because of this work.
Carme Font. Women’s Prophetic Writings in Seventeenth-Century 
Britain. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. xii + 250 pp. 
$149.95. Review by Melinda Zook, Purdue University.
Carme Font’s new book on seventeenth-century female prophets 
demonstrates how women were able to use prophetic writings as a 
catalyst for change, both personal and political. She examines prophecy 
as a literary genre of social transformation that empowered women, 
making them activists. Through a series of case studies, Font’s work 
follows female prophetic voices from the era of the Civil Wars, when 
prophecy peaked, into the early eighteenth century when, as she ar-
gues, many women writers remained committed to social change and 
